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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae are a Committee of Concerned Black Graduates of
ABA Accredited Law Schools, an ad hoc collaboration of individuals who
now work in varied capacities in our nation and around the world.' As
active participants in our democracy, our collective experiences, many of
which are informed by our race, tell us that both in law school and be-
yond, race still matters. Amici's interest arises from the belief that the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program seeks to
correct racial preferences embedded in its traditional admission criteria. A
list of amici and the law schools they attended is attached as Appendix I.
The views expressed in this brief are those of the individual amici and do
not necessarily reflect the views of their respective law schools.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Programs that promote diversity serve a compelling state interest be-
cause they correct the systematic ways in which the traditional admissions
criteria afford racial preferences and because they help to satisfy the de-
mocratic mission of American colleges and universities. In the instant case,
racial diversity serves as a compelling state interest because it promotes the
public and professional missions of the Respondent institution. Genuine
racial diversity at the University of Michigan Law School (the "Law
School") requires race conscious measures. Because the Respondent
1. This brief is submitted with the written consent of the parties. Counsel repre-
sents that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel of any party. Nor did
any person or entity, other than amici or their counsel, make a monetary contribution to
the preparation or submission of this brief.
FALL 2003]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
University of Michigan's admissions process relies so heavily on the LSAT
and other race-infused criteria, there are no effective race neutral alterna-
tives to diversifying this law school. In this respect, the Law School's use
of race is narrowly tailored to counteract known exclusionary effects re-
sulting from reliance on racially embedded admissions criteria. In
addition, the Law School's public goals and democratic mission make
consideration of race the most efficient and robust proxy for the attributes
the Law School seeks in its graduates. Race consciousness in admissions,
therefore, is not a preference but a prophylactic.
ARGUMENT
CORRECTING THE SYSTEMIC WAYS TRADITIONAL
ADMISSIONS CRITERIA EMBED RACIAL PREFERENCES
IS A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST.
1. UNIVERSITIES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED TO
COUNTERACT RACIAL PREFERENCES EMBEDDED IN
TRADITIONAL ADMISSIONS CRITERIA.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 Justice Powell's con-
clusion that the University of California Davis Medical School operated
an unconstitutional quota system was based in part on the fact that the
university had introduced no evidence to suggest that the traditional se-
lection criteria were biased against students of color or that the
conventional criteria failed to assess adequately these students' academic
promise. According to Justice Powell, "[r]acial classifications in admissions
conceivably could serve [another] purpose, one which Petitioner does not
articulate: fair appraisal of each individual's academic promise in the light
of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures."3 The University of
California provided neither evidence of racial bias in traditional admis-
sions criteria nor evidence relating to their failure to predict future
performance. 4
The assumed fairness and functionality of these criteria is at the
heart of the evidence offered by Petitioner in this case. Her claim of "re-
verse discrimination" consists primarily of comparisons, between racial
and ethnic groups, of the different admission odds for applicants with
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. Id. at 306 n.43.
4. See id. ("Nothing in this record, however, suggests either that any of the quanti-
tative factors considered by the Medical School were culturally biased or that Petitioner's
special admissions program was formulated to correct for any such biases.").
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similar test scores and grade point averages.' Based upon this evidence,
Petitioner contends that standardized test scores are a fair and adequate
basis for determining who is entitled to admission at selective colleges and
universities, like the Law School.' Petitioner presents deviations on stan-
dardized test scores as if they are dispositive criteria for assessing claims
under the Equal Protection Clause.
However, the record in this case demonstrates that traditional admis-
sions criteria are in fact flawed. These measures are not reliable predictors
of academic merit or performance after graduation for all candidates.7 The
student intervenors in this case directly challenged Petitioner's presump-
tion that standardized tests constitute objective measures of merit, and that
affirmative action necessarily amounts to a preference for "lesser qualified"
students of color. They presented evidence that heavy reliance on stan-
dardized aptitude test scores constitute built-in racial preferences for
White applicants.' The intervenors correctly argued that affirmative action
is justified, in part, to counterbalance the ways that tests like the LSAT
and SAT tilt the admissions process to prefer affluent White candidates.9
A. Properly Understood, Affirmative Action Is Not a
Preference But Is an Effective and Efficient
Mechanism to Counteract Racial Preferences.
As Justice Powell argued in Bakke, "[t]o the extent that race and
ethnic background were considered ... to ... cur[e] established inaccura-
cies in predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is
no 'preference' at all."'" The empirical data demonstrating the nexus
5. See William C. Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments
in Litigation, Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 173, 177 (2001) (summariz-
ing the standard testing evidence presented at trial by Petitioner).
6. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 38-39, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003) (No. 02-241).
7. See, e.g., Richard 0. Lempert et al., From the Trenches and Towers: Law School Af-
firmative Action:An Empirical Study of Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs
Through Law School, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 468-69 (2000) [hereinafter Lempert
Study] (finding that the Law School minority alumni who entered law school with lower
LSAT scores and GPAs than those of White alumni were as successful as the White
alumni).
8. See generally Expert Reports on Behalf of Student Intervenors, reprinted in 12 LA
,AzA L.J. 373 (2001) (discussing the issue of the racial and ethnic bias on the LSAT and
SAT).
9. See Miranda Massie, Grutter v. Bollinger: A Student Voice and a Student Struggle:
The Intervention in the University of Michigan Law School Case, 12 LA kAZA L.J. 231, 233
(2001) (explaining that "racism and unearned White privilege continue to structure every
aspect of educational experience in the U.S. and in particular, unavoidably mar the use of
allegedly meritocratic criteria like LSAT scores and grades").
10. 438 U.S. at 306 n.43.
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between race and traditional academic criteria makes clear that affirmative
action is a corrective mechanism to ameliorate the extent to which White
racial preferences are incorporated into traditional admissions criteria.
Indeed, affirmative action is not a preference but a prophylactic. Equal
protection is inconsistent with a rule that requires institutions to ignore
the ways that their own institutional practices disadvantage and under-
value minority students.
1. The LSAT Is Reflective of Racial
Preferences.
a. The LSAT is a Flawed Instrument for
Assessing Merit or Predicting Law
School Performance.
Since Bakke, scholars have hotly contested the fairness and function-
ality of admissions criteria because of their current emphasis on
standardized aptitude test scores. Although the LSAT and other similar
aptitude tests benefit from widely shared assumptions that they are an ob-
jective yardstick to measure which students will do well in law school or
college, recent scholarship and evidence presented in this case demon-
strate that these assumptions are unmerited. Such tests, for example, do
not reliably predict those most likely to perform well in college or law
school." Nationwide, the LSAT is about nine percent better than a ran-
dom selection in predicting variation in first year law school grades.'2
Scholars have found that, "[tihere appears to be a threshold beyond which
LSATS just don't matter in terms of predicting law school performance for
both men and women. Furthermore, some students with an LSAT of 30
[which was below this threshold] do as well in law school as others with
perfect (48) or near-perfect scores."1 3
In addition to serving as invalid indicators of law school or college
success, neither the LSAT nor other high-stakes aptitude tests reliably
identify those applicants who will succeed long-term or later in life. For
example, a recent study of University of Michigan Law School graduates
11. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997) (arguing that the LSAT explains at most 21% of the vari-
ance in law school grades for all students by the third year of law school and even less for
the first two years); see also Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the
Myth of Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 11 HARV. BLAcKLETTER LJ. 1 (1994).
12. See Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action
Debate, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1251, 1264 (1995).
13. GUINIER Er AL., supra note 11, at 4. The testing scale for the LSAT has since
changed, so that 180 is the highest score one may now receive.
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shows that traditional admissions processes are not better predictors of
success after law school-whether success is measured by earned income,
career satisfaction, or service contributions-than are the more "whole
person" selection criteria employed by the law school in its efforts to
promote racial diversity.'4
The traditional admissions criteria, in particular, do not predict the
success of minority applicants. Part of the problem is "that neither cumu-
lative grade point averages nor national aptitude test scores have ever been
shown to be anything more than rather crude instruments for predicting
first year grade point averages in given academic settings; and after the
first year their predictive value decreases sharply."'" Indeed, even this pre-
dictive value is overshadowed by the stronger correlation between test
performance and socio-economic status. The particular problem for the
purposes of this litigation is that "whatever the short-comings of [stan-
dardized tests as] 'predictors of ability' for Americans in general, they are
even more untrustworthy insofar as certain minority group members are
concerned."'7
b. The Methods of Constructing
Standardized Tests Prefer White
Test Takers and Predictably
Marginalize Blacks and
Other Minorities.
The creators of standardized tests routinely invalidate questions on
which minorities perform better than Whites and utilize questions on
which White students perform better than minorities. In other words,
test-makers eliminate most questions on which Blacks as a group and
women as a group out-perform Whites and men, respectively. Although
most test-makers discard many of the questions that produce what the
test-makers consider a significant disparate impact between racial or eth-
nic groups, they do not remove questions with a more moderate preference.
The record shows in this case that the racial bias in the question selection
process is not small.'" Indeed, researchers found racial differences in the
14. See Lempert Study, supra note 7, at 468-69.
15. Luke Charles Harris, Rethinking the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate Estab-
lished in the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke Decision, 6 REs. IN POL. &
Soc'Y 133, 145 (1999).
16. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaining the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 988 nn. 148-52 (1996).
17. Harris, supra note 15, at 145.
18. See, e.g., Expert Report of Jay Rosner, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F Supp. 2d 821
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), reprinted in 12 LA RAZA L.J. 377 [hereinafter Rosner
Expert Report].
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answers to every one of 580 SAT questions administered in New York
State in 1988 and 1989:19 574 preferred White test-takers, one preferred
Black test-takers, and five questions were neutral.2 0
Because all of the LSAT questions are pre-tested, test-makers can ac-
tually "predict the percentage of women, Blacks, Latinos, etc., who will
choose the correct answer."'" Thus, before they give the test, test-makers
know the discriminatory impact their tests will have on women and mi-
norities. As expert witness Rosner has found:
The actual task that Law Services performs, year-in and year-
out, is accumulating a test full of individually chosen LSAT
questions with foreseeable cumulative effects, which are that,
on average:
a) Whites will score higher than Blacks;
b) men will score higher than women; and,
c) wealthy students will score higher than poor
students.
2
Thus the racial bias in standardized tests is not accidental; test makers
are aware of the bias and actively structure this bias into the very constitu-
tion of the tests. As this Court recognized in Richmond v. Croson,23 "public
institutions have a public obligation not to become a 'passive participant'
in a system of racial exclusion . 2...,,4 Respondent Law School's race con-
scious evaluation of applicants is a modest effort to correct the
discriminatory effects of this industry-wide phenomenon within its own
admissions process.
c. Performance on Standardized Tests Is
Not an Objective Measure of
Academic Competence.
As a general matter, White students perform better on standardized
tests than Blacks and Latinos. Because of the empirical work of, among
others, Dr. Claude Steele, a professor of social psychology at Stanford
University, it is now known that minority underperformance on stan-
dardized tests is due, at least in part, to "stereotype threat" that is, the
apprehension faced by minority students that their performance on stan-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 379.
22. Id.
23. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
24. Id. at 492.
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dardized tests will confirm the stereotype that they are intellectually infe-
rior to Whites. 25 Steele explains:
[S]tereotype threat ... [is] the experience of being in a situa-
tion where one recognizes that a negative stereotype about
one's group is applicable to oneself. When this happens, one
knows that one could be judged or treated in terms of that
stereotype, or that one could inadvertently do something that
would confirm it. In situations where one cares very much
about one's performance or related outcomes-as in the case
of serious students taking the SAT-this threat of being nega-
tively stereotyped can be upsetting and distracting. Our
research confirms that when this threat occurs in the midst of
taking a high stakes standardized test, it directly interferes with
performance.
26
This threat is real, empirically verifiable, and is a material burden on
minorities who take standardized tests. According to Steele, "[r]elying on
these tests too extensively in the admissions process will preempt the ad-
mission of a significant portion of highly qualified minority students. ' 27
At the same time, Whites, precisely because of race, do not have the
burden of stereotype threat.They therefore benefit from not being racially
stigmatized. Standardized tests perpetuate this racial benefit; affirmative
action helps to mitigate it-and through a method that does not stigma-
tize Whites.
Because stereotype threat renders racial minorities dissimilarly situ-
ated to Whites vis- -vis standardized tests, universities such as the
Respondent Law School account for this difference through their admis-
sions programs within the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, this dissimilarity cannot be reduced to, nor ameliorated by,
class. Indeed, Professor Steele finds that stereotype threat is likely to be
exacerbated, and not mitigated, by middle class status.28
Thus, race itself, not just socio-economic disadvantage, triggers un-
derperformance on standardized tests. Considerations based on income
cannot adequately compensate for the correlation between test perform-
ance and race. Affirmative action thus serves as a modest and
constitutionally permissible mechanism to take into account the various
ways that the predictive measures upon which the University of Michigan
25. See Expert Report of Claude M. Steele, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), reprinted in 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 439, 444 (1999)
[hereinafter Steele Expert Report].
26. Id.
27. Id. at 440.
28. Id. at 447.
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Law School relies do not fully reflect the abilities of all applicants across
race.
2. Legacy and Financially (Wealthy)-Based
Selection Criteria Operate as a Racial
Preference for White Applicants.
Both Petitioner and the Solicitor General consistently refer to af-
firmative action as a racial "preference." Yet many traditional selection
criteria, such as legacy admissions and standardized test scores, directly
benefit White applicants.29 This discrimination is empirically identifiable
and materially affects admissions.
The Respondent University of Michigan Law School, like most law
schools and universities, treats legacy status and potential for making fi-
nancial contributions as "plus factors," although both criteria privilege
Whites because of the racial allocation of wealth." These are preferences
in the truest sense of the word. They are in no way measures of past or
future success, and they operate to benefit a specific group of people,
namely, affluent White applicants. As these preferences demonstrate,
schools frequently depart from ostensibly objective criteria.Yet, as the Pe-
titioner's argument in this case demonstrates, the preoccupation with race
in the consideration of affirmative action programs obscures the operation
of these preferences and creates a distorted race-centered perception of
why applicants such as Petitioner were not admitted.'
B. Universities Should Be Permitted to Employ Affirmative
Action to Counteract the Racial Preferences Embedded
in Traditional Admissions Criteria.
To the extent the admissions "playing field" is slanted in favor of
Whites, universities have an obligation to level it. This Court has long
held that the elimination of racial discrimination is an important govern-
mental interest that is consistent with our constitutional values of equality,
29. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective
Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1067-71 (2002); see also Steele Expert Report, supra
note 24, at 448; Rosner Expert Report, supra note 18, at 379.
30. See generally MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHIm
WEALTH:A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1997).
31. Petitioner claims that she was not admitted to the law school because "less-
qualified" minorities were admitted instead of her. Brief for Petitioner at 2-4, Grutter V.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).Yet, in the chart provided in Petitioner's
brief (which only addresses GPA and LSAT scores while excluding many other factors
considered by the university), White applicants who were "less-qualified" than Petitioner
were admitted the year before she applied. Id. at 7.
[VOL. 9:5
Brief ofAinici Curiae
dignity, and opportunity. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke makes this
abundantly clear:
The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in
ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects
of identified discrimination. The line of school desegregation
cases, commencing with Brown v. Board of Education, attests to
the importance of this state goal and the commitment of the
judiciary to affirm all lawful means toward its attainment. 32
Because the traditional selection criteria lead to "identified dis-
crimination" there is an affirmative constitutional duty on the part of the
states to eradicate, or at least offset, this discrimination. This Court has
long held that states are able to voluntarily make race conscious efforts to
prevent race discrimination. 33 As Justice Powell stated in Bakke, "the guar-
antee of the equal protection clause cannot mean one thing when applied
to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then is it not equal" '34
Thus, the Equal Protection Clause cannot be interpreted to insulate
White applicants' enjoyment of preferences built into standardized tests
and other admissions criteria and simultaneously deny the University of
Michigan Law School the right to ameliorate those preferences on behalf
of otherwise excluded minorities.
32. 438 U.S. at 307 (citation omitted).
33. See, e.g., Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,291 (1986) (O'Connor,J.,
concurring); United Jewish Org. ofWilliamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1977);
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1968); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
34. 438 U.S. at 289-90.
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II. RACIAL DIVERSITY IS A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST BECAUSE
IT SATISFIES THE ACADEMIC AND DEMOCRATIC MISSION OF
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES AND THE MISSION OF THE
RESPONDENT INSTITUTION.
A. Because Race is Not Simply Skin Color, But a Marker
for Social Status, Experience, and Access to Wealth,
Racial Diversity Serves the Academic Mission
of Public Universities.
1. This Court Has Repeatedly Affirmed
the Value and Necessity of Racially
Diverse Educational Environments.
Recognizing the nexus between racial experience and education,
this Court has consistently concluded that racial diversity in higher edu-
cation is a vital component of an effective education. For example, in
Sweatt v. Painter,3 a challenge to racial segregation at a public law school,
this Court reasoned that:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals
and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and
no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the
exchange of views with which the law is concerned.36
In McLuarin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,31 the
Court concluded that "the ability ... to engage in discussions and ex-
change views '3 with students of diverse racial backgrounds is central to
an effective graduate education. Moreover, in Brown v. Board of Education,39
the Court provided that public education is "a principal instrument" in
the development of "cultural values.."40
In Bakke, Justice Powell reaffirmed the logic of these prior rulings,
finding that "the attainment of a diverse student body ... clearly is a con-
stitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education."'
35. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
36. Id. at 634.
37. 399 U.S. 637 (1950).
38. Id.
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1983).
40. Id. at 493.
41. 438 U.S. at 311-12.
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According to Justice Powell, concrete and material "educational benefits
... flow from an ethnically diverse student body."42 Recognizing that race
can be a proxy for experience, Justice Powell found that medical students
of varying racial backgrounds may bring to campus "experiences, out-
looks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better
equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to
humanity. 4 3 Justice Powell reasoned that such racial diversity was an im-
portant ingredient in creating the "atmosphere of speculation, experiment
and creation ... so essential to the quality of higher education .... -44 Be-
cause of these benefits, Justice Powell concluded that admissions programs
"involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin" are
constitutional.
45
2. Racial Diversity Helps to Create and
Sustain a Robust Marketplace of Ideas.
Racial diversity helps to create a robust marketplace of ideas by per-
forming two important speech-related functions, each of which derives
from the fact that race continues to shape social relations and experi-
46
ences. First, racial diversity performs a content function. That is, to the
extent a school is racially diverse, such racial diversity likely will have an
effect on the substantive issues discussed in the classroom. For example, a
constitutional criminal procedure class is more likely to engage in a con-
versation about racial profiling with Black students than without them.4"
The speech-content component of racial diversity is also evidenced by
the manner in which universities have altered their curricular offerings in
response to the constructive demands of a racially diverse student body.8
Acknowledging the relationship between racial experience and
speech is not tantamount to concluding that, for example, all Black people
think alike. It simply means, as this Court has recognized, that with re-
spect to some issues, there is a high level of correlation between race and
42. Id. at 306.
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 320.
46. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly is Racial Diversity?,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1149 (2003).
47. See Roxane Harvey Gudeman, Faculty Experience with Diversity: A Case Study of
Macalester College, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 251, 258 (Gary Orfield & Michael Kurlaender eds., 2001) (finding that because of
the racially divergent experiences of minorities and non-minorities, minorities often in-
troduce issues and analyses that are not generally raised by non-minority students).
48. See Kimberl Crenshaw, A Foot in the Closing Door, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1343
(2002) (linking student diversity to both curricular changes in law schools and theoretical
developments about the law).
FALL 20031
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
perspective,49 a correlation that is much stronger than the correlation be-
tween LSAT scores and first year law school grades. If part of the project
of universities is to promote the full exchange of ideas, and if there is a
relationship between ideas and racial experiences, universities should be
permitted and encouraged to pursue racial diversity. Without it, important
ideas may be lost, and the academic mission of universities compromised.
Justice O'Connor recognized this substantive content function of
diversity in her tribute to the late Honorable Justice Thurgood Marshall.
There, she suggested that Justice Marshall's influence on her derived, at
least in part, from the fact that they had "traveled [down] different
road[s]" ' Justice O'Connor commented that while as a woman she had
"experienced gender discrimination enough,"52 she had no "personal
sense ... of being a minority in a society that cared primarily for the ma-
jority."'53 Justice O'Connor made clear that while she did not always agree
with Justice Marshall, she still found herself "looking expectantly for his
raised brow and his twinkling eye, hoping to hear, just once more, another
story that would, by and by, perhaps change the way I see the world. ' s
Justice Marshall's stories were a direct result of his racial experiences
as a Black man in America. Indeed, this Court's jurisprudence would be
different had Justice Marshall not been a member of the Court, not sim-
ply in terms of the outcome of the cases, but also with respect to the
nature and content of the constitutional discourse they reflect. It is pre-
cisely this difference--simultaneously intellectual, experiential, and in
perspective-that will be lost to the extent that universities are no longer
racially diverse.
The second speech function of diversity is that it facilitates active lis-
tening, learning, and engagement. Because America remains profoundly
racially segregated, many students will have had very little meaningful
interracial contact before attending their college or university. Respon-
dent Law School's expert report, which Petitioner has not rebutted,
demonstrates that negotiating the new interracial experience helps to en-
gender critical thinking and intellectual group cooperation." In short,
49. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2001) (concluding that race
in this case correlates closely with political behavior and "racial identification correlates
highly with political affiliation"); Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (concluding
that legislatures "will ... almost always be aware of racial demographics"); see also DONALD
R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC
IDEALS (1997) (discussing racial disparities in voting practices and policy preferences).
50. See Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall: Thurgood Mar-
shall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992).
51. Id. at 1219.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1217.
54. Id. at 1220.
55. See Expert Report ofPatriciaY Gurin, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F Supp. 2d 821,
850 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928) [hereinafter Gurin Expert Report]. Gurin explains:
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because we evaluate speech based not only on what is being said but also
based on who is saying what, diverse educational environments are more
"attention-grabbing," engaging, and thus critical thinking-inducing, than
environments without racial diversity.6
3. The Speech Benefits of Diversity
Cannot be Realized with Token
Representation and Without
Race Conscious Admissions.
None of the foregoing speech functions of diversity can be realized
with only token representation of racial minorities. If, for example, there
are only a few Black students in a law school class, those students may not
feel comfortable speaking, or at least speaking uninhibitedly. As the ex-
periences of UCLA Black law students demonstrate, they may fear that
they are expected to speak for their race and that whatever they say will
be interpreted as "the Black perspective.""s This suggests that individual
Black students may feel, and are perceived to be, more racially salient be-
cause they are in less racially diverse classrooms. Black students are less
free to be "just individuals" when there is only token Black representa-
tion. Therefore, the lack of racial diversity actually promotes, rather than
discourages, racial identification, racial awareness, and racial consciousness.
Token representation also sends a message that Blacks and other ra-
cial minorities are incapable or undeserving of higher learning, creating
the specter and confirming the stereotype of the intellectual inferiority of
racial minorities. 8 The fewer minorities there are, the stronger the likeli-
hood that this "stereotype threat" will be "in the air."s Far from
stigmatizing students of color, affirmative action counteracts the stigma of
Complex thinking occurs when people encounter a novel situation for
which ... they have no script, or when the environment demands more than
their current scripts provide. Racial diversity ... provides the very features
that research has determined are central to producing the conscious mode of
thought educators demand from their students.
Id.
56. See Shelley Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of
Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYcH. 752, 763 (1980)
(suggesting that people pay attention to the identity of the speaker and not just the con-
tent of the speech).
57. See Brief for UCLA School of Law Students of Color In Support of Respon-
dent at 16-18, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
58. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (observing that segregation imposes feelings of infe-
riority upon Black children).
59. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity
and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997).
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their intellectual inferiority, the existence of which decreases the
likelihood that Black and other minority students will contribute to the
foregoing speech functions of diversity.61
B. Racial Diversity Promotes the Democratic Mission of
Public Schools.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that ethnically diverse educa-
tional settings promote values that are vital to the sustenance of our
multicultural, pluralistic democracy. The idea that public education "is the
very foundation of good citizenship" and is "required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities" is central to this Court's repudia-
tion of segregation in Brown.6 The Brown court specifically emphasized
that public education allowed for the instilling of civic values and facili-
tated the adjustment of students to our democratic culture.62 In Bakke, the
Court amplified the link between a diverse education and democracy,
stressing that "it is not too much to say that the nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and morals of
students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."63
Because universities are important sites for citizenship formation, ra-
cially diverse educational settings help to promote a citizenry that is
racially diverse and mutually cooperative in all spheres of American life.
What students learn in school, they practice in society. Diverse campuses
teach students a core value of democracy: to embrace and respect differ-
ences. Furthermore, because elite schools like the University of Michigan
Law School educate the nation's economic, political, and social leaders, 64
the failure of these schools to admit a broad cross-section of society de-
60. See Expert Report of William G. Bowen, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 E Supp. 2d
821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), reprinted in 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 427,435 (1999)
[hereinafter Bowen Expert Report] (asserting that a student body that contains many
different backgrounds, talents, and experiences would be a richer environment in which
all students could better develop into productive, contributing members of society).
61. 347 U.S. at 493.
62. See id.
63. 438 U.S. at 313; see also Gurin Expert Report, supra note 55, at 850. Gurin em-
pirically substantiated the conclusions of the Brown and Bakke courts by finding that
"students educated in diverse settings are ... better able to participate in an increasingly
heterogeneous and complex democracy" Id.
64. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: THE
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 156-62
(1998) (discussing the prominent role graduates of selective colleges and universities play
in society).
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nies the excluded groups the democratic opportunity to define substan-
tively the econonmic, political, and social content of American life.61
Diverse student bodies allow law schools like Respondent Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School to realize their commitment to public
service, a commitment that is consistent with our democratic values. Em-
pirical evidence demonstrates that Black, Latino, and Native American
graduates use their legal education to accomplish, at higher rates than
their White counterparts, the public mission of the Law School as defined
by the mission statements of both the University of Michigan Law School
and the American Bar Association. 6
IIl. GENUINE RACIAL DIVERSITY AT RESPONDENT LAW SCHOOL
REQUIRES SOME RACE CONSCIOUSNESS. 6 7
A. The University of Michigan Law School's Admissions
Program Is Narrowly Tailored.
The University of Michigan Law School's use of race is narrowly
tailored to counteract the racial bias embedded in the LSAT tests and
other traditional criteria. Respondent's use of race as "one factor among
many" is in accordance with Bakke and is the most narrowly tailored
mechanism to diversify the law school.
65. See Bowen Expert Report, supra note 60, at 435 (explaining that "race neutral
admissions ... would ... severely damage the prospects for developing a larger minority
presence in the corporate and professional leadership of America").
66. The Law School "looks for students likely to become 'esteemed practitioners,
leaders of the American bar, significant contributors to legal scholarship and/or selfless
contributors to the public interest'." Lempert Study, supra note 7, at 396 (quoting Admis-
sions Policy Adopted by the University of Michigan Law School Faculty, April 24, 1992 at
1).The Law School also expects that admitted students will "'have a strong likelihood of
succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-being of
others."'" Id. The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules states unequivocally that "[a] lawyer
... is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibilities for the quality ofjustice .... As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek
improvement of the law, . .. the administration of justice and the quality of service ren-
dered by the legal profession." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT: pmbl. (2003).
67. See Vikram D. Amar, The Bush Administration and the Supreme Court's Michigan
Affirmative Action Cases: Narrow Tailoring and Alternative Methods of Ensuring Diversity, at
http://writ.findlaw.com/amar/20030207.htn-l (February 7, 2003) (explaining that per-
centage plans have a serious flaw in that "[w]hatever success they achieve is possible only
because of racial segregation in neighborhoods and high schools").
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1. The Determination of Narrow Tailoring
Must Be Institution Specific.
An across-the-board determination of what constitutes narrow tai-
loring--a constitutional formalism that requires, for example, schools in
Michigan and Texas to narrowly tailor in precisely the same way-would
limit law schools' capacity to experiment. It would also impose upon
them admissions plans that are doomed to fail. To be meaningful, the nar-
row tailoring analysis has to be contextual, taking the particular
constraints and realities of specific institutions into account. Because uni-
versities are not monolithic, have different application pools, and are
situated in different geographic regions, there can be no one standard for
judging whether an admissions policy is narrowly tailored. The inapplica-
bility of the law school "percentage plans" is but one ample
demonstration of the point that the determination of reasonable alterna-
tives has to be made contextually.68
2. Alternatives Proposed by the United
States Do Not Apply in the
Law School Context.
In its amicus brief, the United States argues that percentage plans
adopted in California, Florida, and Texas are viable alternatives to race
based affirmative action. All of the percentage plans cited by the United
States use high school grades to determine eligibility. These plans suffer
from a serious flaw: they do not address diversity issues related to graduate
and professional school admissions. They also do not apply to any private
university or college that seeks to draw students from around the nation
and around the world. There is no workable way for graduate schools to
implement a percentage plan that offers a certain percentage of college
graduates admission. There are far too many schools around the country
and world with varying standards, so it would be both impracticable and
undesirable to implement such a plan at the graduate school level.
68. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); see also Susan Sturm, Sec-
ond-Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458
(2001) (discussing how the Court adopted an employer framework that is designed to
encourage experimentation and problem solving by employers).
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B. Percentage Plans Are Not Race Neutral Alternatives
to Race Conscious Admissions.
Not only are percentage plans unworkable in the context of gradu-
ate education, they present no comparative advantage to race based
affirmative action in terms of race neutrality. Thus, not only does the
United States fail to highlight the functional limitation of percentage
plans, it also fails to acknowledge that whatever their merit might be out-
side of the precise constitutional inquiry at hand, they are not race neutral
alternatives to the Law School's race conscious admissions policies.
The United States, in its brief, attempts to convince the Court that
percentage plans such as those implemented in California, Texas, and
Florida, are race neutral alternatives to race based affirmative action.
However, these percentage plans were designed and implemented in an
attempt to soften the blow of a referendum in California, court action in
Texas, and administrative action in Florida, each of which effectively
eliminated the use of race as a factor in the admissions decisions of public
universities in those states. 9 The plans were implemented with full aware-
ness that the level of enrollment of underrepresented minorities would
dwindle to a trickle without some affirmative intervention. The plans
were therefore implemented in an effort to maintain, and hopefully in-
crease, racial diversity in the various public institutions. Percentage plans
therefore attempt to achieve the same goals as race based affirmative ac-
tion, but by a route that is more circuitous.
The purported race neutrality of percentage plans is further belied
by the fact that such plans rely on and tacitly condone secondary school
segregation. Both in terms of their objectives and their operation, per-
centage plans are race conscious policies. Because their workability is
contingent on racial patterns, urban and rural configurations, targeted re-
cruiting, and other factors, they are not race neutral alternatives to
affirmative action. The shortcomings of percentage plans do confirm,
however, the basic logic of racial inclusion: the narrowest, most efficient,
and constitutionally sound way to achieve the compelling state interest in
rmcial diversity is to take race directly into account. The University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action plan is thus a narrowly tailored
means to achieve the compelling state interest in diversity and should be
upheld by this Court.
69. The states of California, Texas, and Florida each have a history of providing
limited access to higher education for minorities. Historically separate and unequal public
elementary and secondary school systems in these states has further exacerbated this prob-
lem. See Catherine L. Horn & Stella M. Flores, Percent Plans in College Admissions: A
Comparative Analysis of Three States' Experiences, The Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univer-
sity, at http://www.civirightsproject.harvard.edu/research/affirmativeaction/tristate.pdf
(Feb. 7, 2003)
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CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
should be upheld.
Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Mack Adu
Counsel of Record
37 Shannon Circle
Alameda, California 94502
Dated: February 18, 2003
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